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Potocki and  
the Spectre of the Postmodern 
 
 
 “A spectre is roaming through Europe: the Postmodern”1.  Readers of Jan 
Potocki’s 700-page novel The Manuscript Found in Saragossa are accustomed to 
seeing spectres, ghosts and other forms of revenants.  Such otherworldly creatures 
make up a remarkably high number among the dozens of characters presented in the 
novel, which was written in French by the Polish nobleman between 1797 and his 
suicide in 1815.  Of course, the protagonist, Alphonse van Worden, never 
encounters Postmodernity as such — even though he seems to meet everybody else 
(and her sister) during the sixty-six days of his journey through the Sierra Morena, 
from enlightened encyclopedists to American-Indian princesses, from succubes to 
inkmakers, from a Wandering Jew who met with Christ to the devil himself, from 
hermits and sheiks to bankers and rats...  And yet, as I would like to suggest in this 
paper, what we have come to identify today by the term “postmodern” is in fact little 
more than a revenant, returning to haunt us from the depth of Potocki’s historical 
and narrative imagination.  Is it a pure coincidence that the Manuscript’s return 
from the dead in the 1990s, after two centuries of quasi-oblivion2, corresponded 
with the multiplication of popular anthologies anatomizing the Postmodern debate, 
in a phase Charles Jencks characterized by the publication of “critical summaries of 
the Post-Modern paradigm”3? 
                                                 
1
 Paolo Portoghesi, “What is the Postmodern?” in Thomas Docherty, Postmodernism. A Reader, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 208. 
2
  Potocki’s novel appeared for the first time in its integrity in French in 1989, edited by René Radrizzani 
(and published by José Corti); the first complete English translation by Ian Maclean appeared in 1995.  Apart 
from important but relatively rare and obscure studies published mostly in Poland throughout the 20th 
century, the three main books analyzing the novel have also appeared over the last decade (see next notes for 
references).  The latest forcing of the Manuscript into mainstream media is due to the much publicized re-
release of the 1964 film adaptation directed by Wojciech Has — restored thanks to the passion and financial 
support of such icons as Martin Scorcese and the late Jerry Garcia.  Another avalanche of spectres, indeed, 
with this revenant of a film adapted from a revenant-novel which captured the imagination (and revenu) of 
none other than a Grateful Dead...  (As for Postmodernity’s fascination with spectres, the obvious reference 
is, of course, Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, New York: Routledge, 1994.) 
3
 Charles Jencks, “The Post-Modern Agenda” in Charles Jencks, The Post-Modern Reader, London: 
Academy Editions, 1992, p. 17. 
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By now, this “bizarre novel”, as it presents itself on its first page, has 
received a considerable amount of critical attention shedding precious light on its 
textual history (Zoltowska4), its narrative stakes (Rosset5), or its thematic 
complexity (Fraisse6).  However, many of the philosophical implications of 
Potocki’s work still remain to be unfolded.  Dominique Triaire’s essay7 gives a 
remarkably rich picture of the author’s worldview, particularly of his epistemology, 
his political attitude and his conception of history;  Günter von Kirn8, for his part, 
investigates quite thoroughly the inscription of the Manuscript within the 
ideological and philosophical context of the Enlightenment and of early Romantic 
thought.9  Yet, to my knowledge, the precise relation between the Manuscript and 
what our postmodern age has defined (accurately or erroneously) as “modernity” has 
never received the full attention it deserves.  My point of departure in this article 
will therefore be the following question (borrowing back from Richard Rorty10 a 
terminology he himself borrowed from literary criticism):  what would a 
“redescription” of the Manuscript through the “vocabulary” of postmodernism look 
like?  Beyond the rather pointless exercise of a merely “determining” judgment (is 
Potocki postmodern?), I hope that such an apparently meaningless question will in 
fact lead us to a more substantive exercise in “reflective” judgment, i.e., to a 
questioning of the very categories originally put in play.  Redescribing the 
Manuscript as postmodern may tell us less about the novel itself than about some of 
the conceptual weaknesses and oversimplifications on which the 




                                                 
4
 Marie-Eveline Zoltowska, Un précurseur de la littérature fantastique : Jean Potocki et son “Manuscrit 
trouvé à Saragosse”, Yale University, Dissertation, 1973. 
5
 François Rosset, Le théâtre du romanesque : Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse entre construction et 
maçonnerie, Lausanne: L’âge d’homme, 1991. 
6
 Luc Fraisse, Potocki ou l’itinéraire d’un initié, Nimes: Lacour, 1992. 
7
 Dominique Triaire, Potocki: Essai, Arles: Actes Sud, 1991. 
8
 Günter von Kirn, Jan Potockis “Die Abenteuer in der Sierra Morena”. Ein Roman zwischen Aufklärung 
und Romantik, zwischen Revolution und Restauration, dissertation, Universität Hannover, 1982. 
9
 For a survey of the earlier discussions among Polish scholars on the philosophical background of the 
Manuscript, in particular the contributions by Tadeusz Sinko and L. Kukulski, see Stanislaw Frybes, “Les 
recherches polonaises sur le roman de Potocki” in Jean Potocki et le Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse: Actes du 
colloque de Varsovie, Varsovie, «Les Cahiers de Varsovie», Centre de Civilisation française de l’Université 
de Varsovie, 1972, pp. 125-134. 
10
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
11
 For a comparable endeavour on a different author, see Philip Watts, «Postmodern Céline» in Céline and 
the Politics of Difference, R. Scullion et al. (eds), Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995.  It is a 
pleasure for me to thank Jacques Berchtold, Janet Coccaro, Marina Kundu, and François Rosset, who have all 
brought crucial contributions to my reading of the Manuscript, and to the composition of this article. 
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To be sure, the question I just articulated does not really lead us into a terra 
incognita.  Without explicitly referring to any of the major voices involved in the 
postmodern debate, a critic like François Rosset did in fact present the Manuscript 
as a very Baudrillardesque world of simulacra.  As we will see in more detail below, 
Dominique Triaire offered striking echoes of Jean-François Lyotard’s statements 
when he described Potocki’s political attitude in terms of souplesse.  On a deeper 
level, many scholars have discussed, albeit never in a very satisfactory manner, 
Potocki’s problematic and complex relation to the Philosophes.  Insofar as 
postmodern theory has defined itself, for better or for worse, in contrast with an 
“Enlightenment project” identified (somewhat loosely) with the Encyclopedists and 
their allies, this relation has a direct bearing on my question.  A certain consensus 
emerges, which considers the novel as “a document of a skeptical attitude which 
aims not only at the fantastic and its secrets, but also at the rational methods of 
«explaining» such secrets”12.  “The Manuscript sets itself at a critical distance as 
much towards the orthodoxy of the Church as towards the intellectual systems of the 
Enlightenment which, in their false radicality, build new dogmatic forms of 
constraint” (von Kirn, 275).  “A unique attempt at a synthesis of the Enlightenment, 
classicism and romanticism” (ibid; 3), the novel is commonly portrayed in the 
position of a hinge, deeply anchored in, and indebted to, the new spirit brought 
about by the Philosophes, but already opening the door to further critical horizons 
which will use the Enlightenment’s tools to undermine the Enlightenment’s house. 
In order to explore such intuitions a little further, let’s try and throw a few 
keywords which would describe the formal features of the novel, and the first 
impressions it produces on its readers.  This should allow us to have a first, if 
superficial, glimpse at the postmodern dimension of the Manuscript, before moving 
on later to its broader and deeper ideological stakes. 
1. Indeterminacy.  Doesn’t the Manuscript, at least in its first hundred pages 
which are paced by the maddening rhythm of multiple awakenings under the 
gallows, each making the reader doubt the reality of the previous one, offer one of 
the most radical experiences of ambiguity, rupture, and displacement known to 
world literature?  After such a shock treatment, indeterminacies do in fact pervade 
all interpretations and constitute the reader’s world. 
2. Fragmentation.  Even if the novel does eventually put all its threads 
together into one single consistent narrative structure, its mode of presentation — 
through the interruptions of the days, the jumps from one narrator to another, the 
parallel montage of multiple story lines — demonstrates a remarkable “openness to 
brokenness” and seems decided to resist tooth and nail any attempt by the reader to 
totalize the stories into one closed and self-contained meaning. 
                                                 
12
 Kazimierz Bartoszynski, “Structure et Signification du Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse” in Jan Potocki & 
the Writers of Enlightenment, «Literary Studies in Poland/Etudes Littéraires en Pologne» No XXIII, 
Wroclaw, 1990, p. 61.. 
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3.  Decanonisation.  Many scholars have stressed the “derision of authority” 
at work whenever a paternal figure is staged in the novel — van Worden, Soarez, 
Avadoro seniors immediately come to mind13.  Here again, what is the Manuscript, 
if not a constellation of petites histoires spread along the widest variety of 
heterogeneous language games (gothic novel, picaresque tales, history of religion, 
geometrical demonstration, pledge of secrecy, metaphysical speculation, erotic 
compulsion, moral prescription), which obstinately resist our best attempts at 
subsuming them under one single “metanarrative” or “mastercode”?   The process 
of deligitimization at the heart of posmodernism is remarkably prefigured by the 
novel’s perverse jouissance in staging unbelievable and untrustworthy figures of 
authority. 
4.  Self-less-ness.  Depth-less-ness.  Problematically enough for those critics 
eager to place the novel on the side of Romanticism, Potocki’s characters are 
desperately devoid of any psychological depth.  None of them demonstrates the type 
of pathos usually associated with the hypertrophied conception of interiority which 
was developing in the Europe of the time.  Even when their sense of self is not 
openly “challenged” (in the PC sense of that word, as it is the case for Pèdre 
Velasquez), even when the narrative fails to multiply them into hardly 
distinguishable reduplications of the same (sister-sister, father-son, etc.), they all 
seem affected by a radical “fake flatness” which prevents any serious possibility of 
identification on the part of the reader. 
5.  The Unpresentable, Unrepresentable.  Something in the Manuscript 
fundamentally repels mimesis:  no less than the flatness mentioned under the 
previous heading, what prevents any immediate adherence to the fictional world is 
the very multiplication of such flat surfaces (characters, story lines, language 
games), endlessly reflecting each other in the absence of any solid and stable core 
reality.  As François Rosset has brilliantly showed in his book, the representative 
process is always-only liminary, staging and contesting only the modes of its own 
representation.  At the hollow center of this constellation of petites histoires, there is 
an intolerable, unthinkable, abject absence (the absence of ultimate truth).  The 
horror of the gallows which haunts the first days of the narrative is in fact highly 
reassuring and comforting, compared with the radical negativity — an “intolerably 
free exchange between signs and death” — on which the novel turns its last page 
with inhumane indifference.  It is precisely this remarkably pure and deadly 
beautiful form of negativity which Jean Fabre alludes to in his comments upon the 
ending of the narrative, which he compares to a “bulle de savon” or to the “cigarette 
                                                 
13
 See Janet Coccaro, Illusions and Disillusions: the Search for Truth in Jan Potocki’s Manuscript found 
in Saragossa, dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1999, chapter three;  also Marie-Eveline Zoltowska, «La 
démocratisation de l’idée de l’honneur dans le Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse de Jean Potocki», Etudes sur le 
XVIIIe siècle, No 11, 1984, pp. 39-52. 
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de Mallarmé dont la fumée monte comme une pure néantisation, une rêverie du 
néant”14. (More on this later.) 
6.  Irony.  That irony assumes a central function in the economy of the 
Manuscript has become a commonplace among critics.  As early as 1847, Zygmunt 
Kasinski described the book as “a remarkable work, but hyper-ironic and reckless 
(archi-ironique et effréné)”15, while Günter von Kirn stressed more recently the 
“ambivalence” and the “distanciation through irony” displayed by the novel (206).   
7.  Hybridization & 8. Carnivalisation.  Such a carnavalisation is openly 
thematised by the Bohemians’ lifestyle, where jesters cross-dress as Wandering 
Jews or demon-ridden lost souls.  It reaches its high point in Avadoro’s endless 
metamorphoses across genders and social status, from Elvire, a “future vice-queen”, 
to a nameless beggar, to the Marquis Castelli, a courtier plotting among the highest 
spheres of wealth and power.  More generally, the ludic and subversive nature of the 
polyphony staged in the Manuscript leaves the reader constantly wondering about 
the seriousness and the real meaning of every scene:  from the gory depictions of 
demons and revenants to the extended dissertations on Egyptian religion, from the 
most outrageous claims of scientific arrogance to the most desperate scenes of 
suicide, one is never sure where the pathos starts and where the pastiche begins.  In 
this wealth of textual thefts and intertextual clins d’oeil, clichés and plagiarism seem 
to be the only stable game in the Sierra.  This travesty of a novel constantly borrows 
and multiplies contradictory voices, in a polyphonic process of hybridization pushed 
to the point where no genre, no opinion, no ideology, no point of view can any 
longer be identified as authoritative, or even simply authorial16. 
9.  Performance, Participation.  Within the Manuscript’s fictional world, 
most sub-narratives “invite performance” in the sense that they are “performed” by 
various actors (playing a Wandering Jew, Pacheco, a hermit) rather than being 
simply told.  Not only do the Bohemians function as a performing band, but the 
“gaps” and “indeterminacies” left in their stories also invite a constant involvement 
on the part of their narratee (van Worden):  the Venta Quemada is uncannily close to 
these virtual universes generated in our postmodern age by interactive computer 
games where the viewer/player is swallowed into the diegetic world and finds 
himself in the double position of the audience (for whom the whole fiction is 
staged) and of a character (whose fate is being determined as the story develops).  
On a higher level, it is the real history of the book’s publication which illustrates, in 
                                                 
14
  Jean Fabre in one of the discussions recorded in Jean Potocki et le Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse, op. 
cit., p. 219. 
15
 Quoted in Z. Markiewicz, «L’aspect préromantique du Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse, sa réception par 
les romantiques français», Revue de littérature comparée, No 50 (1-2), janvier-juin 1976, p. 76. 
16
 Commenting on a paper by Jean Decottignes which focused on the “polyphonic” nature of the 
Manuscript, Jean Fabre stressed that “polyphony should be understood not only as a plurality of voices in 
discourse (in the ordinary sense), but as some sort of perpetual dissonance within each theme” (Jean Potocki 
et le Manuscrit, 204). 
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the most striking manner, “art’s vulnerability to time, to death, to audience, to the 
Other”:  the manner in which this found manuscript was indeed quasi lost for two 
centuries, the polemics generated by its recent resurrection17 are no less romanesque 
than the roman itself.  “Gaps must still be filled” in the text currently at the public’s 
disposal...  The indeterminacies and decanonisations staged in the fiction have 
infiltrated the published book itself, for which we still lack a definitive and 
canonical edition.  Here again, the limits between the inside and the outside, reality 
and fiction, the stage and the audience are uncannily blurred, in a manner 
reminiscent (or rather anticipatory) of the interactive and open-ended practices 
favored by postmodern artists in their games, installations and websites.   
10. Constructionism & 11. Immanence. François Rosset has shed full light on 
the essential self-containment, self-referentiality (immanence) and self-denounced 
artificiality (constructivism) ruling the game played by the Manuscript:  functioning 
as a “theater of the romanesque”, the “construction” of the novel displays “a 
gigantic narrative machine which refers only, in the last analysis, to its own 
movement”:  “in this carnival of a novel, the play/game (le jeu) ends up proclaiming 
the vanity of discourses, the erosion of meaning, the tragic inanity of knowledge” 
(back cover). 
The reader familiar with the “Postmodern debate” will have recognized by 
now the list of “The Eleven ‘Definiens’ of the term Postmodern” provided by one of 
its first “coiners”, Ihab Hassan18.  Even if it is a well-recognized feature of the 
                                                 
17
 See Daniel Beauvois, “Jean Potocki méritait mieux”, Dix-huitième siècle, No 22, 1990, pp. 441-447. 
18
 Ihab Hassan, “Pluralism in Postmodern Perspective” in Jencks, The Postmodern Reader, 196-199.  
Let’s quote the terms provided by Hassan to define his categories: 
1.  “Indeterminacy, or rather indeterminacies.  These include all manner of ambiguities, ruptures and 
displacements affecting knowledge and society. [...] Indeterminacies pervade our actions, ideas, 
interpretations; they constitute our world” (196). 
2. “Fragmentation. The postmodernist only disconnects; [...] his ultimate opprobium is ‘totalisation’” 
(196). 
3.  “Decanonisation [...] We are witnessing [...] a massive ‘delegitimation’ of the mastercodes in society, a 
desuetude of the metanarratives, favoring instead ‘les petites histoires’ which preserve the heterogeneity of 
language games.” (196) 
4.  “Self-less-ness.  Depth-less-ness.  Postmodernism vacates the traditional self, stimulating self-
effacement — a fake flatness, without inside/outside — or its opposite, self-multiplication, self-reflection” 
(196). 
5.  “The Unpresentable, Unrepresentable.  Postmodern art is irrealist, aniconic [...] its hard, flat surfaces 
repel mimesis. [...] It becomes liminary, contesting the modes of its own representation. [...] ‘What is 
unrepresentability?’ Kristeva asks. [...] ‘That which, through meaning, is intolerable, unthinkable: the 
horrible, the abject’ [...] ‘the exchange between signs and death’.” (197) 
6.  “Irony.  In the absence of a cardinal principle or paradigm, we turn to play, interplay, dialogue, 
polylogue, allegory, self-reflection — in short, to irony. [...] These express the ineluctable recreations of mind 
in search of a truth that continually eludes it, leaving it with only an ironic access or excess of self-
consciousness” (197). 
7.  “Hybridization, or the mutant replication of genres, including parody, travesty, pastiche” (197).  
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Postmodern (and probably the only one universally agreed upon...) to elicit any 
attempt made to capture it in a non-ambiguous definition — hence its spectral 
nature: “this amorphous thing remains ghostly”19 —, the Manuscript’s rich response 
to the stimuli suggested by Hassan’s (deceptively) handy checklist should suffice to 
catch our attention.  The main question, however, remains to be tackled:  under the 
surface of its narrative presentation, is there anything in the intellectual attitude 




I will address this question from the point of view of four issues which play a 
central role in the postmodern debate as well as, I believe, in Potocki’s work:  lack 
of self-confidence, the aporia of judgment, political souplesse, and the debunking of 
human pretensions to mastery.   
Lack of self-confidence.  According to Zygmunt Bauman, “the concept of 
postmodernity refers to a distinct quality of intellectual climate, to a distinct new 
meta-cultural stance, to a distinct self-awareness of the era [...] The most poignant 
of the postmodern experiences is the lack of self-confidence.  [The postmodern 
period] tries to reconcile itself to a life under conditions of permanent and incurable 
uncertainty;  a life in the presence of an unlimited quantity of competing forms of 
life, unable to prove their claims to be grounded in anything more solid and binding 
than their own historically shaped conventions”20.   
As we have already noted above, the world of “indeterminacies” into which 
the reader is thrown by the novel leads her, along with the protagonist, to being on 
the verge of “losing her reason” (MS 108/128)21.  While the first hundred pages of 
                                                                                                                                                    
8. “Carnivalisation [which] further means ‘polyphony’ [...] in its ludic and subversive elements that 
promise renewal” (198). 
9.  “Performance, Participation. Indeterminacy elicits participation; gaps must be filled.  The postmodern 
text, verbal or nonverbal, invites performance [...]  As performance, art (or theory for that matter) declares its 
vulnerability to time, to death, to audience, to the Other” (198). 
10. “Constructionism.  Postmodernism [...] ‘constructs’ reality in post-Kantian, indeed post-Nietzschean, 
‘fictions’” (198). 
11. “Immanence.  This refers, without religious echo, to the growing capacity of the mind to generalize 
itself through symbols.  Everywhere we witness problematic diffusions, dispersal, dissemination [...]  
Languages, apt or mendacious, reconstitute the universe [...] into signs of their own making, turning nature 
into culture, and culture into an immanent semiotic system” (198). 
19
 Thomas Docherty, “Introduction” to Thomas Docherty, Postmodernism. A Reader, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 1. 
20
 Zygmunt Bauman, “The Fall of the Legislator” in Docherty, Postmodernism, pp. 135. 
21
 In the quotes from the Manuscript, the first page number will refer to the English translation (Jan 
Potocki, The Manuscript Found in Saragossa, London: Penguin, 1995); the second page number will refer to 
the French original in its most common current edition (Jean Potocki, Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse, Paris, 
Livre de Poche, 1992).  All translations of articles originally published in French or German are mine. 
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the book certainly constitute a challenge to the rationalist attitude often associated 
with the (French) Enlightenment, it is important to notice how Potocki subtly but 
dramatically displaces the Cartesian framework with which he plays.  As in the 
Méditations métaphysiques, van Worden and the reader are led to a position of 
radical doubt, where the distinction between being asleep and awake vanishes, 
where everything they perceive seems to be no different from the “playful 
mystifications of dreams” (ludificationes somniorum)22:  “all that I had seen over the 
last few days had so perplexed my mind that I no longer knew what I was doing, and 
if anyone had tried they could have made me doubt my own existence” (MS 
93/113).  
Behind the obvious and numerous similarities, however, one should note at 
least three significant displacements.  First, the situation is not so much framed in 
terms of identity as in terms of action (“I no longer knew what I was doing”):  the 
real question with which Alphonse finds himself faced is no longer “who/what am 
I?” (“quisnam sim ego ille”) (52), but rather “what should I do?” or, more precisely 
even, “what should I (not) say?”.  Second, the “genium aliquem malignum” (ibid.) 
whose profile is sketched behind the hypothetical “if anyone had tried” is no longer, 
as in Descartes, an abstract and extreme theoretical possibility:  in van Worden’s 
case, the “evil genius” is a reality, incarnated by the sheik and his accomplices.  
Moreover, the agency in which the hypothesis of the Cartesian si me fallit 
materializes no longer belongs to the supernatural realm of the divine (or demonic):  
in Potocki’s world, humans are manipulated, fooled, deceived and lured by other 
humans. Third, the rock of certainty on which Descartes could rebuild the modern 
skyscraper of human knowledge (ego existo, certum est) is itself contaminated by 
doubt in Potocki’s rewriting.  Other humans can not only deceive me in what I 
perceive, they could also “make me doubt my own existence” (should they choose 
to do so).  The foundation of confidence on which Descartes laid the groundwork of 
modern science is radically undermined, condemning us from now on to live and act 
“under conditions of permanent and incurable uncertainty”.   
It is significant in this regard to find this lack of confidence stated by one of 
the characters most often described by the secondary literature as a representative of 
the Philosophe (of the deist persuasion), Pèdre Velasquez.  After having expressed 
his hope to reduce human emotions as well as human history to geometrical 
equations, this caricature of a scientist can’t help but recognize the limits of 
scientific reason (and the correlative necessity of faith) in our making sense of our 
world:  “we are blind men who can feel some walls and know the ends of several 
roads.  But we mustn’t be expected to know the map of the whole city” (MS 
417/447).  In describing the physicist as “always striving to understand” but “always 
half-understanding” (MS 408/439), Velasquez and Potocki do more than express a 
typically postmodern feeling of “opprobium on totalisation”.  To go back to 
                                                 
22
 René Descartes, Méditations métaphysiques, éd. Beyssade, Paris: Livre de Poche, 1990, p. 44. 
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Bauman’s quote, they put forth “a new distinct meta-cultural stance”, where 
scientific knowledge and the Christian revelation, or even cabbalism and the 
Muslim prophecy, appear merely as competing (and incommensurable) forms of 
understanding, which are ultimately “unable to prove their claims to be grounded in 
anything more solid and binding than their own historically shaped conventions”23. 
The aporia of judgment.  For Potocki as for his postmodern grandsons, such a 
relativist attitude bears its most problematic consequences when the human subject 
has to use her faculty of judgment.  Velasquez feels compelled to limit the scope of 
reason because he cannot resort to “expose the faith of ethics to the mercy of 
sophistry” (MS 410/441).  Faith, openly based on “prejudices” (the traditional 
enemy of the Enlightenment project), is necessary to “offer man a surer mainstay 
than reason” (ibid.) when time comes to move from the question “who am I?” to the 
question “what should I do?”.  And here again, this aporia of judgment is directly 
presented by the Manuscript through a character explicitly and precisely located in 
his relation to the Enlightenment:  Blas Hervas is, literally, the son of an 
Encyclopedist, the son of this branch of the Lumières who fell into the double (and 
specifically modern) hubris of totalisation and atheism (see von Kirn, 262sqq).  
After having witnessed his father’s demise and suicide, Blas sees his philosophical 
spectre return in the form of Don Bélial, who leaves little doubt about his own 
intellectual filiation:  “I am one of the principal members of a powerful society 
whose aim is to make men happy by curing them of the vain prejudices which they 
suck in with the milk of their wet-nurse, and which afterwards get in the way of all 
their desires.  We have published very good books in which we demonstrate 
admirably well that self-love is the mainspring of all human actions” (MS 521/560).  
Whether one recognizes La Mettrie, Helvetius, Sade, Voltaire, d’Holbach, Diderot 
and/or “toute la morale du XVIIIe siècle”24, it is clearly the French Enlightenment 
gathered around the Encyclopédie which appears under the mask of the Devil.  And 
the main point of this Mal masqué is to stress the moral relativism taught by the 
Philosophes:   
 
“just and unjust [...] are relative qualities.  I will make you see this 
with the help of a moral fable: Some tiny insects were crawling about on the 
tips of tall grasses.  One said to the others: «Look at that tiger near us.   It’s 
the gentlest of animals.  It never does us any harm. The sheep, on the other 
hand, is a ferocious beast.  If one came along it would eat us with the grass 
                                                 
23
 Claiming a double (and incommensurable) standard of truth for “natural philosophy” and for the 
Christian religion was, obviously, in no way a “new stance” in 1815...  The novelty resides in the fact that (1) 
religions are historicized (i.e., cut from any immediate anchorage in the divine) by the Wandering Jew’s 
narrative, but that simultaneously (2) purely human accounts of our human reality are nevertheless perceived 
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which is our refuge.  But the tiger is just.  He would avenge us.»  You can 
deduce from this, Señor Hervas, that all ideas of the just and the unjust, or 
good and evil, are relative, and in no way absolute or general” (MS 521/560). 
 
Even if the moral dilemma facing Blas Hervas is rather crude (save an 
innocent victim or satisfy his own selfish desires), the fact that he makes the 
“wrong” choice, and the fact that the novel ultimately fails to provide any 
convincing argument as to why this choice was wrong at all, contaminates the whole 
moral philosophy conveyed by the narrative with a feeling of uneasiness.  To Don 
Bélial’s unfettered logic of personal interest, the only alternative is provided by 
Enrique Velasquez, Pèdre’s father, who describes himself as a “strangely 
(bizarrement) constituted” creature, “in whom selfishness is scarcely perceptible”;  
among the few members of this “proscribed race”, “some are passionate about the 
sciences, others about the public good” (MS 269/293).  Here again, however, the 
son reveals the weaknesses of the father:  Enrique’s selflessness and his feeling of 
being “part of a great unity” take a purely ridiculous turn in the géomètre’s “absent-
mindedness”, as if losing one’s mind is the price to pay for endeavoring to cultivate 
a disinterested reason.  Enrique’s désintéressement is not a solution, nor even a true 
alternative to the “morale du XVIIIe siècle”, but merely a “bizarrerie”, an 
“aberration of nature”, or simply another “idea of the just and the unjust”, no more 
absolute or general than any other. 
At the end of all these ironic twists, the narrative leaves its reader with a 
feeling which anticipates the aporia described by many a postmodern thinker.  
Whether they emphasize the impossibility legitimately to deduct a prescriptive from 
a descriptive25 or whether they evoke the “ghost of the undecidable” raised “in every 
event of decision”26, they all describe a situation which fits perfectly with van 
Worden’s (and the reader’s) dilemma.  One has to judge, one has to take sides 
(between the cousins and the hermit, between commitments made to different 
churches, between allegiance to conflicting parties, between various interpretive 
hypotheses) without being in a position to know for sure either the real nature of the 
choice nor its real consequences.  On which basis should van Worden determine 
whether his cousins are demoniac temptresses or victims in need of protection?  
How could he decide to oppose or follow the Gomelez’ conspiracy, when every bit 
of information concerning them seems to be a product of their very conspiracy?  
Even more cruelly, how can he direct his actions when the main concept which used 
to guide his previous moral choices (l’honneur) was shattered during his first days 
in the Sierra Morena?  In the absence of a satisfactory system grounding the “idea of 
the just” in a consensual description of reality (and giving it the strength of a 
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concept), the moral agent is condemned to a scattered and case-by-case approach, 
exposed to the vicissitudes of trial and error, under the constant pressure of an 
“urgency that obstructs the horizon of knowledge” (Derrida, 967).  “Here lies the 
basis for an ethical demand in the postmodern [...] We must judge: there is no 
escape from the necessity of judging in any specific case.  Yet we have no grounds 
upon which to base our judging. [...] We must behave justly towards the face of the 
Other; but we cannot do that accordingly to a predetermined system of justice, a 
predetermined political theory” (Docherty, 26)27. 
Political suppleness.  For, of course, such aporias in the definition of the just 
bear considerable consequences on the conception of politics.  Dominique Triaire’s 
description of Potocki’s political attitude resonates strongly with the positions taken 
by the Jean-François Lyotard of Instructions païennes or Just Gaming.  Both seem 
to prefer to “stay as close as possible to the event” rather than “elaborating in the 
abstract grand theories” (Triaire, 77);  both value “a great theoretical suppleness” 
(104);  for both, “politics provides only a temporary fix (un raccommodage)” (105), 
and for both, “perfection is a dangerous chimère” (105).  Both seem to share a 
common resistance to producing “a general representation of politics” (93) which 
would systematize their thought and provide a totalizing map for further action.  
Convinced that “there is no science of the political” (Lyotard, Just Gaming, 28), 
both refuse to play the role attributed in the modern period to the Intellectual.  One 
could trace such political suppleness all the way to the personal choices made by 
both writers, from Potocki serving the Russian empire (which had just invaded his 
country) to Lyotard denouncing the dead ends of technoscience and of the logique 
du capital from the hometown of CNN and Coca Cola.  No less than Avadoro, who 
provides an almost pathological example of “suppleness”, “tolerance” and 
“sveltness”28 throughout his endless personal and political metamorphoses, the duke 
of Sidonia illustrates the posture of “disillusionment” (see Coccaro) so central to 
postmodern politics.  Having learned the hard way “that it was not enough to want 
(vouloir) to do good, one [also] had to know (savoir) how to do it” — even if, as we 
have just seen, one simultaneously and contradictorily realizes that politics cannot 
be the object of a true savoir — the duke hangs on to “prudence” as a safer 
substitute for the dangerous “chimères” of his youth (MS 315/341), anticipating 
Lyotard’s call “to distinguish intelligence from the paranoia that gave rise to 
«modernity»” ("Tomb", 7). 
The postmodern incredulity towards master-narratives implies a similar 
incredulity towards la raison politique as such.  The various forms of Stalinism 
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which littered the 20th century with millions of corpses have scarred a whole 
generation’s political sensitivity, and — legitimately or not — have led many to 
echo Velasquez’ early warning:  “reasoning [...] is a dangerous instrument which 
can easily harm the person using it.  What virtue has not been attacked by reason?  
What crime have people not tried to justify by it?” (MS 410/441)  While many 
tenors of the postmodern debate have carefully resisted all attempts to enlist them 
under openly reactionary banners, it would be hard to ignore the convergence 
between postmodernity’s second thoughts about the dangers of the political reason 
in which the Enlightenment grounded its emancipatory efforts, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the direct filiation popularized by neo-conservative 
historians between Jacobinism and Stalinism, as if Robespierre’s terreur and the 
Gulag were both necessary consequences of any attempt to force a human project of 
emancipation onto the spontaneous inertia of the existing state of things.  Here 
again, it would be (too) easy to suggest parallels between the socio-historical 
positions of unjustifiable privilege enjoyed by Potocki (as a member of the highest 
Polish nobility) and by late 20th-century theorists of the postmodern (as members of 
wealthy Western societies) — who both would have much to lose in rocking their 
social boat too harshly.   
What seems undeniable however is that, across two centuries, a similar 
political attitude of suspension appears to be shared by Potocki and his grandsons, 
an attitude he perfectly expressed in a comment on a Greek word which was to elicit 
abundant reflection in postmodern circles:   
 
“The Ancient Greeks used to express with the verb epochein this 
attentive rest (ce repos attentif) after which one starts again to act in new 
erring endeavors (nouveaux errements).  Carneades, in order to explain the 
value of this word, says that the Epoché is like the posture of an athlete who 
tries to estimate the strength of his enemy or the attitude of a charioteer who 
holds his horses ready to enter the field (qui retient ses chevaux prêts à entrer 
dans la carrière)” (quoted in Triaire; 86).   
 
Lyotard’s description of his own “paganism” is stated in the similar 
vocabulary of “a move in a context”, on a field which is “a place of ceaseless 
negotiations and ruses”, where “there is no reference by which to judge the 
opponent’s strength; one does not know if s/he is a god or a human” (Lyotard, Just 
Gaming, 43).  This moment of suspension wherein one stops to wonder whether the 
enemy is “a beggar” or “a god” (or an enemy at all) is linked to a sharp awareness of 
one’s own fragility:  the postmodern political subject always remembers that “there 
is no possible discourse of truth on the situation”, that he “has to judge therefore by 
opinion alone, that is, without criteria” (43), that all his moves are “always tactical”, 
and only tactical, mere “instructions” reduced to a local context, never to be 
understood as “slogans”, for “a slogan belongs to a general strategy” which is 
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precisely what he can no longer pretend to devise (54-55).  What many critics of the 
postmodern movement have condemned as a mere “withdrawal” from the political 
sphere is perhaps more accurately conceived, as Potocki helps us to do here, as a 
form of epoché, a retenue which in no way excludes the possibility of active 
interventions, as long as these are purely “defensive and local” (Lyotard, "Tomb", 
7), but which remains always wary of getting carried away by its own horses into a 
career of thoughtless commitment.   
The debunking of human mastery.  This prudence leads to my last point of 
convergence, the status of human mastery.  In the straw man standing for “the 
Enlightenment” in postmodern discourse, three interconnected features are usually 
taken as main targets for denunciation:  universal reason, emancipation and 
autonomy.  All three come together in the figure of "the modern subject" as master-
of-his-destiny.  The process of emancipation implied in the notion of Enlightenment 
or Aufklärung leads to a state where the subject can “de-subjectify” himself, gain 
access to “objective” knowledge and give himself the best possible laws which he 
will have devised thanks to his universally rational knowledge.  At the horizon of 
this process lurks Laplace’s dream of a Central Intelligence Agency which could 
trace the current position of every object in the universe, understand the laws of 
physics, and therefore be in a position to determine all future movements of every 
single body.  At the higher level of complexity represented by human societies, a 
similar enterprise of measurement, understanding and calculation, developed by the 
“social sciences”, will allow mankind to devise for itself laws capable of 
maximizing its common happiness.  Condorcet’s Esquisse usually gives a historical 
(and historically highly pathetic) face to this emancipatory project (eloquently 
summarized by Lyotard in many letters of his Postmodern Explained).   
How does the Manuscript stage such a project?  The overarching structure of 
the narrative seems indeed articulated precisely along the lines of an (individual) 
process of emancipation.  If, as Docherty puts it, “the Enlightenment aimed at 
human emancipation from myth, superstition and enthralled enchantment to 
mysterious powers and forces of nature through the progressive operations of 
critical reason” (5), van Worden does indeed ultimately free himself from his 
fanatical infeodation to honor, from his various religious prejudices, as well as from 
his episodic fear of the supernatural.  Dominique Triaire goes as far as presenting 
the protagonist as an image of the Enlightenment’s triumph : “The Manuscript is 
[...] a metaphorical narrative of the Revolution: Alphonse appears in the first days as 
a child of the Ancien Régime, but he will manage to adopt the ideals of the young 
bourgeoisie, the daughter of the Enlightenment.  Van Worden represents an anti-
Potocki, the Revolution as successful;  he will find his place in the new social 
order” (219). 
Moreover, the novel also presents another striking image of truly impressive 
mastery in the Gomelez.  Here is a Central Intelligence Agency capable of 
controlling every aspect of van Worden’s reality, of manipulating it (and him) in 
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exactly the direction they had planned for their own purpose.  Nothing seems to 
escape their grip, to the point where the most inconceivable events of the first 
hundred pages eventually make perfect sense, once the organization’s unlimited 
power of delusion is ultimately revealed.  In a paradox remarkably suggestive of a 
central contradiction of modernity, it is by going through a phase of total alienation 
(during which he is completely subjected to the Gomelez’ machination) that van 
Worden ultimately becomes free.   
This gleaming illustration of human mastery is in fact much more “modern” 
than the caricatural master portrayed by postmodernity.  Rather than focusing on an 
individual (Robespierre, Stalin, Pol Pot, etc.), the novel locates the Agency in an 
organization.  Less than the person of the sheik, who never appears particularly 
powerful as a character, it is the power of the Gomelez as a collective agent which 
the novel conveys to us most forcefully.  As we have already seen, Potocki brings 
down from heaven into a purely human world the figure of the all-powerful god (or 
evil genius) in the deceptive face of which Descartes constructed his self.  It is now 
other humans, associated into a omnipotent organization, which can control my 
universe, manipulate me in the labyrinth of their inextricable deception, and even 
make me doubt of my very existence.   
Is this to say that the Manuscript prefigures Orwell’s 1984?  Obviously not:  
Potocki’s tale is too interested in twin sisters to leave much room for any Big 
Brother.  What the novel stages is rather a systematic debunking of any figure 
pretending to occupy a position of mastery.  The “archi-ironique” tone of the novel 
is the first device which prevents any character, any institution, any system, any 
ideal from gathering enough credibility to appear as threatening.  Seen through the 
eyes of his fool, no master is likely to command much respect.  On another obvious 
(thematic) level, the novel multiplies the depictions of ridiculous attempts at 
mastery:  Diègue Hervas (in his pretension to master the complete circle of human 
knowledge), van Worden senior (in his fanaticism to master the infinite subtleties of 
the point d’honneur), as well as, indistinctly, all the father figures (in their hopeless 
efforts to guide the behavior of their children, see Coccaro, ch. 3) illustrate the fatal 
failure of any would-be master, invariably condemned by the logic of the narrative 
to bite the dust in the end. 
And yet, what about the two central examples we just encountered?  Doesn’t 
Alphonse become an enlightened master of his destiny?  Aren’t the Gomelez 
sufficiently skilled at manipulating illusions to become masters of the world?  
Precisely not!  And since this may be the most strikingly postmodern feature of the 
whole narrative, we may need to pause and reflect for some time on the status of the 
novel’s controversial ending.  A good example of the controversy is provided by a 
discussion which took place during the Warsaw Conference dedicated to Potocki in 
1972.  Karel Krejci stressed the “superficiality and banality of the ending, which 
contrasts with the refinement of the exposition” and which could be explained, 
according to him, either by Potocki’s depressed mental state during the last years of 
Potocki and the Spectre of the Postmodern          15 
his life, or even by the fact that the novel may have been left unfinished by its 
author, and completed hastily by its first translator, Chojecki29.  In holding this 
view, Krejci was in fact expressing a feeling that most readers of the Manuscript 
certainly experienced as they closed the book:  after 700 pages of a masterful 
narrative build-up, the epilogue does indeed appear botched and leave the reader 
somewhat disappointed.  True, we are given a final display of fireworks, but the 
explosion takes place underground, sounding very much like a narrative dud.  As the 
sheik provides a rational explanation which dissolves all the disturbing illusions 
displayed during the previous sixty-five days, one can hardly help wondering what 
was the real point of such a virtuosic display.   
It is precisely the absence of reality in the ending of the novel which has 
appealed to other interpreters.  During the discussion following Krejci’s remarks, 
Maciej Zurowski objected that, on the contrary, the “finale was a masterpiece”, 
whose main achievement, according to Jean Fabre, consisted in its very nothingness 
(une pure néantisation, une rêverie du néant) (Jean Potocki et le Manuscrit, 218-
219).  In their rich and multidimensional analysis of the epilogue, both François 
Rosset and Luc Fraisse stressed the central void which the novel’s ending 
designates at its very core: like a last curtain drawn on the théâtre du romanesque, 
the epilogue both covers up and denounces the emptiness of the stage as well as the 
irreality of the fiction which briefly filled it with illusions;  in its very refusal to 
provide the comfort of a final message, the ending forces the reader to look at the 
narrative construction itself as the sole raison d’être of the literary enterprise (see 
Rosset, 198-205);  the exhaustion of the (supposedly inexhaustible) goldmine on 
which the Gomelez had built their power is at the same time a metaphor of the 
author’s exhausted inspiration and a send-off signal for the literary work;  as the 
fictional world (mine tarie) passes the relay to the real book (manuscrit conservé), 
reality appears as what shuts off the production of meaning:  “once the labyrinth has 
been destroyed, once the education has been completed, then starts true life, which 
is to say that there is nothing left to narrate” (Fraisse, 128-138).   
All these interpretations are certainly correct in focusing on the way the 
epilogue stages the juncture between reality and fiction, since it is at this juncture 
that the question of meaning is raised most vividly30.  The end is disappointing 
because of its refusal to make a point, that is, a point which would go beyond the 
inner play of the fiction.  In other words:  after the sheik’s rational explanation of all 
the spectres and mysteries which haunted van Worden’s experience, everything 
makes sense but, simultaneously, everything appears as devoid of any satisfactory 
meaning.  The virtuosic display of illusions falls flat — of a flatness, a 
depthlessness considered by some as “the supreme formal feature” of postmodern 
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artifacts31.  As we have already seen above, Potocki denies his reader any “depth of 
meaning” by preventing his characters from gaining any real psychological 
consistency.  The “waning of the affect” (Jameson, 10) constantly illustrated in the 
Manuscript contributes to the anti-climactic nature of its epilogue:  Alphonse 
mentions his father’s death with the same brevity and unaffected tone he will use to 
list his military promotions.  The novel ends without any of the weight of pathos a 
narrator is expected (by us modern readers) to bring to his final words.  The 
affective dimension implied in the experience of putting an end to an enterprise 
(producing a sense of loss, sadness, nostalgia, hope, etc.) is erased from the 
narrative — just like, according to Jameson, the depthlessness of Andy Warhol’s 
Diamond Dust Shoes prevents the affective interplay of expression and projection 
taking place in front of Van Gogh’s Pair of Boots.  Such “waning of the affect” 
deprives us of the “human meaning” we have come to expect from (post-Romantic) 
novels. 
But, more importantly in my view, if the last pages of the Manuscript have 
been perceived by many as lacking in depth of meaning, it is mostly because they do 
not attempt to anchor the petites histoires told by the novel in a superior master-
narrative, which would provide a “message” transcending the fictional world to 
guide the reader in her real-life (ideological, existential, political, etc.) dilemmas.  
On this level, the Manuscript perfectly satisfies Lyotard’s requirement for a 
“postmodern fable” to be “in no way finalized towards the horizon of an 
emancipation”32.  
To be sure, Alphonse is enlightened by his sixty-six days in the Sierra 
Morena.  But what does this enlightenment lead to?  A few successful financial 
investments, the title of general, a few meetings with his cousins and the children 
born from their unions, the position of governor bringing him “the charms of a quiet 
life” (MS 631/669) as well as the opportunity to copy and seal his manuscript for his 
family’s future records.  Good for him, the reader might say, but what does that 
leave us with?  He did indeed “find his place in the new social order”, as Triaire 
noted, but, as Fraisse also suggested, of such a flat and bourgeois definition of 
success, there seems to be nothing meaningful to say. 
Similarly, the Gomelez are perfectly good at manipulating their victims in 
their world of delusions, but they ultimately appear to be good for nothing.  Granted, 
they manage to enroll Alphonse among their ranks and get offsprings of his blood, 
which was the purpose of their three-month long machination.  But this brilliant 
success can scarcely hide the extent of their overall collapse.  The almost all-
powerful organization built over generations of patient efforts in order to conquer 
the world and convert it to Islam finds itself, in the last pages, out of troops, out of 
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resources and, worst of all, out of project.  As is the case for the novel itself, their 
success in enlisting van Worden has no point.  It will make no difference for their 
doomed future.  Nor, by the way, does the defeat of a Muslim conspiracy give 
anyone reason to salute a Christian victory.  The religious, political, ideological 
framework which would give meaning to such words as “defeat” and “victory” has 
simply been pulled from under the feet of History’s agents.  The Central Intelligence 
Agency may be all-powerful in manipulating Alphonse’s experience in the Sierra 
Morena, but what we witness in the book are the last sixty-six days of its existence, 
before its unglamorous self-destruction in the mine’s final implosion.   
It is significant that this implosion apparently causes no human casualty.  To 
paraphrase a famous postmodern anthem, it’s the end of the Gomelez’ world as they 
knew it, but everybody feels fine.  As each conspirator walks away with his share of 
the common loot (from 50 000 to a million sequins), they all have reasons to cheer.  
The real victim is left unmourned:  it is the organization itself.  It looks as if, like 
Margaret Thatcher, nobody among the Gomelez believed in (secret) “societies” 
because all they ever encountered were only “individuals”.  And along with the 
organization goes its project.  Lyotard is certainly right in presenting the project as 
that which “gives modernity its characteristic mode”:  during the modern period, 
legitimacy has come from “a future to be accomplished”, a “universal Idea”, or the 
“Idea of a universal subject” whose emancipation would justify (and provide 
meaning to) our actual practices.  He also describes perfectly the Manuscript’s 
ending when he argues — against Habermas — that “the project of modernity (the 
realization of universality)” is not merely “incomplete”, but has been “destroyed, 
«liquidated»”33.  This is precisely what is at stake in the epilogue.  As the Gomelez’ 
project of world mastery is eventually traded for a few sequins, it is very literally 
«liquidated», transformed into liquid assets — which the banker Moro suggests 
Alphonse should invest in an already global market: “you must buy property in 
Brabant, in Spain and even in America.  Please allow me to see to this” (MS 
627/665).  The frustration felt by the readers of the epilogue (wondering what is the 
meaning of Alphonse’s success) echoes very closely the one experienced by the 
postmodern subject faced with the “victory” of capitalism: “Success is the only 
criterion of judgment technoscience will accept.  Yet it is incapable of saying what 
success is, or why it is good, just, or true, since success is self-proclaiming, like a 
ratification of something heedless of any law.  It therefore does not complete the 
project of realizing universality, but in fact accelerates the process of 
delegitimation” (Lyotard, Postmodern Explained, 18-19). 
The novel’s ending is indeed a masterpiece, crowning the masterful build-up 
of the narrative construction with a radical debunking of mastery.  Such is probably 
the most truly postmodern dimension of the Manuscript, if one follows Jameson in 
equating postmodernism with “the cultural logic of late capitalism”.  It portrays the 
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human subject as caught in a web of simulacra artificially generated by other 
humans to lure him under meaningless banners, emptied of any substantial 
allegiance, and ultimately resorbed into cash benefits.  Unprecendented means of 
manipulating our human world coalesce into Decentered Unintelligent Agencies 
which have given up any socio-political project and strive mainly to maximize their 
short-term profit in a headless race towards the self-destruction of their source of 
wealth and power.  The corpses, spectres and ghosts faced by Alphonse at the 
beginning of his journey prefigure the spiritual death and the revenants his 




“Modernity was lived in a haunted house.” (Bauman, 140)  Look for spectres 
and you will probably see them everywhere.  The same is certainly true of the 
“ghostly” postmodern.  So — apart from the minor (but vital) profit a literary work 
makes by lending itself to such exercises — what is to be gained through a 
redescription of Potocki’s novel in the vocabulary of the postmodern?   
First, it could invite us to exert more prudence in our characterization of 
modernity.  The Enlightenment, in its French incarnation at least, was everything 
but “an era of certainty”: as Bauman himself acknowledges later, only a gross 
oversimplification can allow us to pretend that modernity “seems never to have 
entertained similar doubts [as raised in the postmodern age] as to the universal 
grounding of its status” (135).  If an author like Diderot deserves to be counted 
among the tenors of the Enlightenment, the most superficial reading of his work 
should convince anyone of the profound uncertainty at work at the very core of 
modern thought.  The fact that Potocki wrote at the very end of the Enlightenment 
(in particular after the trauma of the French Revolution) should not prevent us from 
seeing that he expressed doubts already voiced by many among the Philosophes 
themselves.  As a consequence, his skeptical staging of the excesses of rationalism 
and his pessimism about the possibility of human mastery are less a condemnation 
than a furthering of the thought developed by the Enlightenment.  Günter von Kirn 
had already clearly indicated that “Potocki pushes the critical thinking characteristic 
of Enlightenment philosophy against the Enlightenment itself, not in order to attack 
it, but in order to further its skeptical attitude by turning it against itself” (222). 
Potocki, as well as Diderot, provides a concrete illustration of “the 
implication of the postmodern within the modern itself”34.  The point has already 
been made countless times that, in spite of its deceptive labeling, the “post”-modern 
is less to be conceived as what comes after modernity than as its ever-present darker 
side.  Lyotard, among others, has been particularly clear on this issue:  
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“Rather we have to say that the postmodern is always implied in the 
modern because of the fact that modernity, modern temporality, comprises in 
itself an impulsion to exceed itself into a state other than itself. [...]  
Modernity is constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant with its 
postmodernity. [...]  Postmodernity is not a new age but the rewriting of some 
features claimed by modernity, and first of all modernity’s claim to ground its 
legitimacy on the project of liberating humanity as a whole through science 
and technology.  But as I have said, that rewriting has been at work, for a 
long time now, in modernity itself”35. 
 
It is this active and unceasing “rewriting” of modernity by itself which may 
legitimize the exercise in redescription carried out in this article.  Beyond easy 
oversimplifications, (re)writers like Potocki or Lyotard are the ones who carry the 
furthest the unsettling questions seeded by the Philosophes.   
A basic precaution in order to clarify our ideas could consist in questioning 
the equation established among most participants in the postmodern debate between 
Modernity and Enlightenment.  The disturbing historical gap between the 
“ideological” breakthrough of modernity (reaching full speed around 1750) and its 
“aesthetic” counterpart (maturing really in the second half of the 19th century) 
should warn us of a possible major flaw in our periodization.  One can only wonder 
what would have happened if the debate about the “project of modernity” had 
coalesced around the 1880s rather than around the 1780s, i.e., on the other side of 
the major trauma constituted by the Industrial Revolution. 
In a reflection which attempts, precisely, to situate the postmodern in relation 
to transformations in the productive process (the “formal” vs the “real”  
subsumption of labour within capital, the latter corresponding roughly to the 
development of the IT revolution, “globalization” and Jameson’s  “late capitalism”), 
Antonio Negri asks whether “the postmodern is a new form of romanticism” in its 
“negation of the revolution of the Enlightenment”36.  In other words:  does one find 
anticipations of the postmodern in Potocki simply because our culture, for two 
centuries, has been oscillating between a brighter (1780s, 1960s) and a darker 
(1810s, 1980s) side of Modernity?  Even though such a circular and disenchanted 
view seems to please many of our contemporaries, Negri suggests that, while both 
romanticism and the postmodern symptomatize a transformation in the relation 
between subjectivity and capitalist domination, they each react to a very different 
phase in the development of the productive process.  The characteristic feature of 
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our age, according to Negri, is to be found in the fact that most of the Western 
populations are now being transformed into intellectual workers, who carry their 
productive tools (fixed capital) within their brain.  This evolution will have far-
reaching, and still inconceivable, consequences:  by identifying the main means of 
production with the intellectual potential of the workers themselves, by making it 
necessary for the reproduction of capital to invest in the education of the labour 
force, by relying always more heavily on the production and communication of 
information, by encouraging the flexibility (suppleness) of the work force, by 
having to take into consideration the body’s affects in order to guarantee proper 
functioning of the workers’ brain, a drastically new logic of production of 
subjectivity37 is taking shape under our very (short-sighted) eyes.   
Now, isn’t it precisely such a process of production of subjectivity which is 
investigated and displayed throughout the Manuscript?  It is difficult to imagine a 
more striking illustration of the emancipatory promise, as well as of the inherent 
dangers, of “productive biopolitics”38 than the collective production of offsprings 
for the Gomelez family through the necessary (re)education of van Worden’s brain 
and the manipulation of his body’s affects.  Drugs and fascinations, “sociétés du 
spectacle” and parodies of moral maxims, History lessons and geometrical 
demonstrations, all concur in a formative enterprise made successful by an artful 
mastery of an in-formation technology : while Alphonse is originally attractive as a 
mere source of semen (and of proles), it is clear from the beginning that the real 
stakes of the narrative concern his self-consciousness, with all its lures, delusions, 
lapses, aberrations, contradictions, incompleteness, and plasticity.  At the end of the 
process, a re-born and re-tooled subject has learned to be flexible, to play his role 
and find his place in the collective network of power and communication which 
produced him, and which will in turn be reproduced through his ephemeral 
participation. 
Such is the story that modernity keeps rewriting from Diderot and Potocki to 
Lyotard and Negri: the constant metamorphosis of a spectral subject.  Like all lost 
souls, the subject is given no natural place in the world.  Like all ghosts, it refuses to 
die.  Like any old revenant, it is now coming back under a scary and unrecognizable 
guise:  collective rather than individual, means of production instead of end in itself, 
object of manipulation as much as source of agency. 
The role played by the spectre (of the subject) in this work of “rewriting” is 
perfectly illustrated by the story of Athenagoras, adapted from Pline and inserted 
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into the 11th day of van Worden’s travels — in a tale which provides a striking 
model for the hauntology which Derrida evokes as the revenant of classical 
ontology39.  After having acquired at a “reasonable” (i.e., bargain) price a haunted 
house, the philosopher Athenagoras, afraid of imagining “idle phantoms”, 
“concentrated his mind, his eyes and his hands on his writing”.  As the spectre came 
around and loudly rattled his chains, the philosopher “went on writing as though 
nothing untoward had happened”.  Invited by the ghost to follow him into the 
courtyard where the apparition soon vanished, he put some grass and “feuilles” 
[“leaves” but also “sheets of paper”, “pages”] on the ground to locate its place of 
disappearance.  He had it dug out the following day, uncovering bones caught in 
chains — for which he provided a proper burial: “and ever since the corpse was paid 
its last respects, it no longer disturbed the peace of the house” (MS 126/147). 
In the haunted house of modernity, nobody believes any longer in ghosts, not 
even the theorists of the postmodern, who flatly acknowledge their incapacity to 
define the idle phantom they pursue.  Yet, no matter how much one writes, one 
cannot make oneself totally deaf to the calls for emancipation coming from long 
forgotten victims:  no (ir)rationalization can let us ignore the obvious fact that 
someone (or something) is in chains, and in pain.  Our senseless but not meaningless 
task consists therefore in heeding the call of this spectre en souffrance (in the 
existence of which nobody dares to believe), and in devoting a few of our pages to 
marking its point of vanishing, which may some day be its point of surprising 
resurgence...  I know of no more suggestive depiction of the task of the literary critic 
in the postmodern age. 
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